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U.S. ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING: A LESSON FOR CANADA
William A. Mogelt

INTRODUCTION
Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be here. If you look at your original
invitation and agenda for this meeting, you will see that I am not on it. I was
asked to participate in this meeting and substitute for Dan Fessler, who, for
several years, was the embattled chairman and president or the California
Public Utilities Commission. He is no longer there. I asked what Dan was
going to talk about, and nobody knew, so that gives me a great deal of
latitude.
Since Dan was the original invitee, I thought there must be a connection
with California, and since I am doing much of my work in the so-called
energy restructuring in California, I am not going to say anything about
Canada nor will I talk to the exploitation of any natural resource because, as
you probably know, electricity is not a natural resource; it must be
manufactured from other energy sources. So, basically, I am here with an
open invitation to say what I want.
I will talk about what happened in California and will then raise one
fundamental question about electricity restructuring in the U.S. and in other
countries: why should we engage in restructuring? As other states in the U.S.
going through restructuring, what are the lessons that we can draw? I think
once we go through all of that, maybe the lessons for Canada and other
places as to whether or not they should restructure will become evident.
THE FAILURE OF ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN CALIFORNIA
In a word - which this is not - California instituted a bad plan and, in
combination with bad luck, achieved a bad result.

t Partner, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., Washington, D.C. B.A., cum laude,
Hobart College; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania. Additional biographical information
available at page xv.
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The Bad Plan
I view the electric restructuring plan of California as akin to a Chinese
menu. California decided not to restructure fully, but rather chose to pick the
parts of a restructuring approach, selecting only the pieces it thought were
most appropriate. That was a mistake. First, the plan forced the utilities in
the state to sell their generation - the big machines that generate electricity.'
In retrospect, that was a huge mistake, because it left the utilities - Pacific
Gas & Electric and in the northern part, Edison in the south and San Diego
Gas & Electric in the southern part of the state - without the ability to
generate electricity to meet needs, but instead were forced to buy electricity
from outside sellers.
Who were the sellers? A litany of names that have become infamous:
Enron, Williams, Mirant, and Southern. They had the three utilities, which
were essentially forced into purchasing energy as captive customers,
alongside any other entities that wished to buy electricity directly from them.
California has a very strong environmental movement, and that movement
has precluded the building of new power plants in the state in the decade
prior to the restructuring. 2 And that was a major problem in California, since
this had caused a shortage of generation. While the other states that had been
successful with restructuring - particularly Pennsylvania and Ohio and Texas
- had excess generation, 3 California had a deficiency of generation when it
began its restructuring efforts.4
Furthermore, at the utilities' encouragement, the plan required that the
utilities not enter into long-term contracts for power, but instead purchase
power on the spot market.5 The utilities thought they were smarter, wiser,
and more experienced than everybody else in California and could buy power
cheaper than anybody else, and that turned out not to be correct. California
then froze 87 percent of the retail rates in the state. Thus, when the crisis hit
1 See Peter DeFazio & Tony Corcoran, Stop Deregulation Before it Hurts Oregon,
(Eugene, Oregon), May 13, 2001, available at http://www.registerguard.
com/news/20010513/1 f.ed.col.defazio.0513.html (stating that the public utilities commission,
and not the law itself, required the companies to sell their generating capacity).
2 No major power plants have been built in California for the past 10 years. See Kevin
Bonsor, "How California's Power Crisis Works", at http://www.howstuffworks.coml
california-powerl .htm.
3 See John Kwoka, California: The Perfect ElectricalStorm, FTC:WATCH, Feb. 14, 2001,
availableat http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/104.cfm ("[D]eregulation is far less wellsuited to dealing with capacity shortages than with periods of ample supply").
4 California must import about 20 percent of its power. EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE,
REGISTER-GUARD

LEARNING FROM CALIFORNIA: POWER SHORTAGES AND UNIQUE MARKET RULES LEAD TO PRICE

SPIKES 4 (2001).
5 Jerry Taylor & Peter Van Doren, Cato Institute, California'sTroubles Not Caused By
Deregulation,availableat http://www.cato.org/dailys/01-17-01 .html (Jan. 17, 2001).
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in the summer of 2000, retail rates were frozen but wholesale rates (i.e.,
power sold by companies like Enron) were well above those retail rates. 6 It
makes very poor business sense to be in a business where you can only sell at
a price that is lower than your procurement costs.
Bad Luck
Everything that possibly could go wrong in California went wrong.
Starting in late 2000, the price of natural gas - the fuel of choice for
generating electricity in California - nearly tripled.7 Californians had
experienced a hotter-than-average summer, so there was a huge demand in
California for electricity for air conditioning loads. The state then had a
warmer-than-normal winter in the previous year, and that meant that the
quantity of hydroelectric power that could be produced was constrained by
the lower amount of runoff.
California also was in the midst of a boom in its economy. One of the
reasons that California went forward with restructuring was to jump-start its
economy, which had been lagging. The economy improved on its own
without any intervention, so the demand for energy increased dramatically,
and the demand for energy in adjoining western states such as Nevada (given
that Las Vegas is the fastest growing community in the United States8)
increased as well, so California was limited in its ability to import power at
reasonable prices from adjoining states.
Furthermore, California had emissions problems. 9 Some of the power
plants had serious maintenance problems.10 On top of all of this, they had an
early onset of winter." All of these factors were just plain bad luck and had
nothing to do with California's restructuring plan, but all of these factors
simply exacerbated the effects of a very bad plan.

6

See id. (retail rates could not exceed 6.5 cents per kilowatt-hour, yet wholesale rates

were as high as 15 cents).
7 The price of natural gas was two-and-a-half times more than it was in the previous year.
See News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 30, 2000) (statement of Tom
Williams, Duke Energy), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/economy/july-decOO/
electric I 1-30.html.
8 City of Las Vegas, at http://www.ci.las-vegas.nv.us/ (last visited July 25, 2002).
9 See PAUL JOSKOW, CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY CRISIS 30 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 8442, 2001), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8442.pdf. (the
prices of air emissions permits required by generating plants rose by a factor of more than
ten).
10 See Kwoka, supra note 3 (noting that in California, with a razor-thin margin of
electricity supply, when one plant goes down for maintenance, the entire grid can experience
stress, and rates will multiply).
1 EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 4, at 1.
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Bad Result
What happened? Some of the problems included high utility prices,
supply shortages, rolling blackouts, 12 and the bankruptcy of the largest U.S.
utility, Pacific Gas & Electric. The last element is very important, because
that is what is occupying many people in California today. Because at least
two of California's investor-owned utilities (IOUs) had liquidity problems,
the Department of Water Resources bought power from companies like
Enron when it was extremely expensive, and entered into long-term contracts
that have a potential liability of approximately $40 billion. 13 That is a big
number, even in California, the fifth largest economy in the world. 14
That is what happened in California; I would be surprised if such a thing
could or would happen anywhere else, but who knows?
THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTRICITY
Many people who work in the energy business do not have a sense of
some of the unique properties of electricity. I am a graduate of the
University of Pennsylvania, and our patron is Benjamin Franklin. His
experiment with a kite only proved that he was very lucky not to be
electrocuted that night he was hit by lightning.
Electricity does not exist in nature; it must be manufactured. You
probably know that there are numerous fuel sources that can be used to fuel
the machines that generate electricity: oil, natural gas, hydroelectric, solar,
geothermal, etc.
One of the properties of electricity that is extremely important is that it
cannot be stored - except in batteries. Obviously, the battery in your
automobile (or for some of us, in our golf cart) is storing it for a limited
period of time, but electricity cannot generally be stored. In other words, you
cannot make it at off-peak periods, hang on to it until the thermometer
reaches 95 degrees, and then release it.
Secondly, electricity must be made, consumed and distributed in fairly
localized geographic regions. Theoretically, you can transmit electric power
from California to Florida, but not much is going come out of the wire in
Florida. Electricity, unlike the natural gas or oil that flows through a
pipeline, tends to follow the path of least resistance. As a result, the
12

E.g., Paul Rosta, California Orders Rolling Blackouts,

ENG'G NEwS-RECORD,

Jan. 18,

2001, availableat http://enr.construction.com/news/enrpwr_11801a.asp.
13 Nancy Vogel, Sellers Protest State Bid to Void Energy Pacts Electricity, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 2002, at B8, availableat 2002 WL 2462963 (notes that the state purchased around
$43 billion in long-term contracts that it cannot afford to pay).
14 California Technology, Trade and Commerce Agency, at http://commerce.ca.gov/state/
ttca/ttca-homepage.jsp (last visited July 30, 2002).
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properties of electricity that make it unique, and these properties in toto make
a truly national electric market much more difficult in the United States than
a national natural gas market.
PRINCIPLES OF ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING
What is restructuring in the United States all about? In other countries
where we have worked, we call it "liberalization" of the electric market.
Basically, restructuring "unbundles" or separates the pricing of the
generation component from the two other major components, transmission
and distribution, in the price of delivered electricity.
The transmission and distribution components of electricity remain
regulated on the state level subject to traditional public utility regulatory
review, but the unbundled or deregulated generation is unregulated and can
be sold at market prices. The theory behind this is that if you have many
sellers competing to sell generation, the price will go down, and consumers
will be able to shop around and buy generation from multiple sellers instead
of just buying it from only one seller. Furthermore, due to competition
among sellers, in addition to lower prices, you will have innovations and
possibly other services that will be bundled with generation to maximize
consumers' benefits. These restructuring principles have worked in the
natural gas industry, but are struggling to work within the context of the
electric industry.
These are some other principles that are inherent in restructuring that
transmission. In the restructured distribution system, the wires that are used
for transmission are treated as "open access," meaning they are akin to a
common carrier and the entities that own the wires cannot restrict who uses
them and must offer the same non-discriminatory terms and conditions to all
third parties.
The second important part of restructuring is transparency: customers
must know the price that power is being sold and the prices are being
charged for transmission and distribution. Along with this issue is the
concern with "stranded costs recovery" - a very sensitive issue in the United
States. That is, the investor-owned utilities made significant investments in
past years for equipment and other electricity generating, transmitting and
distributing facilities. If those facilities are not used because of this
competition from new sellers, someone must pay for those utility
investments; the utilities themselves have taken the position that the
shareholders should not have to pay. Ratepayers, naturally, believe that the
cost should not be passed on to them. Some sort of compromise is usually
worked out.
The federal government, through the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), has created organizations called independent system
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operators (ISOs) or regional transmission operators (RTOs) to be the
unbiased, detached, and separately-regulated entities that oversee
transmission and congestion relief issues on a nondiscriminatory basis. In
any particular region or state, the wires themselves are generally owned by
third parties (usually by the utilities), but the capacity is allocated for use by
these independent agencies. These agencies use a tariff structure that is
regulated by FERC.
RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA
Figure 1. State-by-State Restructuring
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Restructuring Delay and the "Enron Effect"
What Figure 1 shows is that the states in the darkest colors - seventeen
out of fifty - have deregulated electricity. Seven states have delayed looking
into restructuring and 26 are not restructuring. You can see from this
patchwork map that restructuring has not swept the United States with the
enthusiasm. Moreover, the restructuring in many of the states is different
from the restructuring in neighboring states, so even in the states that have
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fully restructured electricity, there may be few common threads and many
inconsistencies.
Restructuring in Ohio
One of the reasons why I will about Ohio is because it is one of the better
examples of successful restructuring in the United States. Ohio began with
what is termed "retail choice" a year ago, and it has worked fairly well. The15
state's siting board policy encouraged the construction of new generation.
The policy has been positive toward merchant companies coming in and
building generation within the state.
Restructuring in Texas
Texas has excess generation capacity. The state has enough excess
generation to light New York City continuously; that is, it does not mean just
for one day, it means every day. There are simply far more sellers in the
market than there are consumers. Texas, like Ohio, has a very strong policy
encouraging the siting of new plants.' 6 Texas also has a very mature natural
gas pipeline system to deliver the fuel of choice to those plants.
Furthermore, the state has encouraged investment in upgraded transmission
lines.
Texas has another virtue: when it comes to electricity, Texas is a country
unto itself and it is not integrated into the grid that connects the lower 48
states. 17 Thus, Texas does not have problems of power leaving the state, as
they basically have all the power they need and can keep it within their own
state. It is a very unique arrangement.
Restructuring Efforts in Other States
Pennsylvania is also considered to be one of the positive examples of
electric restructuring in the United States. Pennsylvania, like its neighbor
Ohio, has a surplus of generating capacity. In contrast with California, the
utilities there were not required to divest themselves of generation.
15 See, e.g., News Release: Ohio Power Siting Board Approves the Construction of Three
New Major Electric Generation Facilities (May 20, 2002), at http://www.puco.ohio.gov/

media/2002/02041.cfm.
16 Texas, in the midst of deregulation, decided to rid itself of a siting board. Legislative
Transition Task Force (Virginia Electric Utility Restructuring Act), at http://dls.state.va.us
groups/elecutil/10 16_Ollaepstates.htm (last visited July 30, 2002).
17 Watt's In the News, at http://www.snopud.com/swarchives/wn0l/052901.htm (May 29,
2001) (the Bush Administration is studying whether to bring Texas into the grid because it has

a surplus in generation.).
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The results of restructuring have generally been mixed. In Texas, only 5
percent of residential consumers have expressed any interest in switching
away from a utility to an unregulated merchant power seller. 18 In Maryland,
the place where I live, approximately 2 percent of homeowners have
switched. 19 In Virginia, customers who have switched have reported $10 per
month savings on an average utility bill of about $100-140 per month. In
20
Pennsylvania, less than ten percent of residential customers have switched;
generally, those who have switched have been large industrial consumers,
factories, fast food restaurants, et cetera. It has not really become a factor in
the residential market.
THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING
Notwithstanding my dim report to you, I think that the future of
restructuring is bright. I think there are many benefits that can be achieved.
Right now, in the short term, restructuring is having problems, and the largest
problem - putting Enron aside - is that if you look at the other major
merchant companies that are active national players, they are all showing
significant problems on their balance sheets. One of the reasons for this, in
my view, is because of the uncertainty of restructuring in the United States
and the inconsistencies in restructuring among the several states.
Is there going to be a national market for what we do? Do we really have
a business that we can grow and develop? Right now, the answer seems to
be not yes. We have (and I assume most other countries have) an electric
grid that was designed for the old days, when vertically integrated, investorowned utilities owned the generation, transmission and distribution, and the
grids were interconnected. As I said, in the lower 48, all but Texas are
interconnected, but that interconnection was largely for safety reasons as
opposed to an attempt to market energy produced by, say, Texas plants to
consumers in Ohio. There are not enough ways to move electricity around so
as to have a truly national electricity market. It has been estimated by the
federal government (who we all can trust when they make estimates) that the
expenditure requirement would be around $13 billion.

18 Only about 3 percent of Texas consumers have switched utilities. Electric Structuring
Weekly Update, Feb. 15, 2002, at http://www.eren.doe.gov/electricity-restructuring/weekly/
feb 15_02.html#tx.
19 MARYLAND OFFICE OF PEOPLE'S COUNSEL, REPORT ON ELECTRIC CHOICE 5 (2002)
(according to the State of Mayland, 2.6 percent of residential customers have switched).
20 See Lois Caliri, Rush to Switch Providers Unlikely After Deregulation,ROANOKE TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2001, available at http://www.roanoke.com/roatimes/news/story121939.html (after
deregulation in PA, around 10 percent of eligible consumers have switched utilities).
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In summary, we in the United States have invested an enormous amount
of intellectual capital into electric restructuring but have only gotten uneven
results. Thank you very much.
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